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1. Introduction 
 
In the last decade, courts in several Commonwealth countries have recognized discrete 
actions for the invasion of privacy. These causes of action share many common 
features, but also contain important differences.1 In England, the action is aimed at 
protecting against unwanted disclosures of private information, and is conceptualized 
not as a tort, but as a modified form of the ancient equitable action for breach of 
confidence.2 In New Zealand, there are now two discrete torts of invasion of privacy—
one applicable to unwanted disclosures, and the other capturing bare intrusions into 
private spaces.3 Australia appears to be following a similar path, although the 
jurisprudence there is less developed.4 And in 2012, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
created a new tort of intrusion upon seclusion in Jones v Tsige,5 modelled largely on 
American common law.6 At present, this tort only applies to intrusions into private 
affairs, but there are indications that it will evolve to capture unwanted disclosures of 
private information in the future.7 
 
To date, Ontario is the only Canadian province with a firmly established 
common law privacy tort, although Nova Scotia may not be far behind.8 Four other 
                                                          
1 Some of these similarities and differences are canvassed in Chris DL Hunt, “Privacy in the Common Law: 
A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeals’ Decision in Jones v. Tsige” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s LJ 
665. 
2 Campbell v MGN, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [Campbell]. 
3 Hosking v Runting, [2004] NZCA 34 (disclosures); C v Holland, [2012] NZHC 2155 (intrusions). 
4 See e.g. Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, [2001] HCA 63; Doe v Australian 
Broadcasting Corp, [2007] VCC 281; Grosse v Purvis, [2003] QDC 151. 
5 Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241 [Jones]. 
6 The common law approach is reflected in the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, vol 3 (American Law 
Institute, 1977) at s 652A-D. 
7 Justice Sharpe, on behalf of the unanimous Court of Appeal, drew upon the doctrine of Charter values to 
justify creating a privacy tort. He also adopted the Supreme Court of Canada’s taxonomy of privacy as 
reflected in its section 8 Charter jurisprudence (elaborated on in the section immediately below). 
Importantly, one dimension of privacy is “informational privacy” and this, his Lordship noted, has long 
been understood by the Supreme Court to encompass, broadly speaking, a “claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others” (see supra note 5 at para 41). This passage suggests that the court would extend 
the action to cover unwanted disclosures of private information in the future. Moreover, American common 
law, which was influential in Jones in shaping the intrusion upon seclusion tort, has long had a disclosure-
based action as well (ibid at s 652D). 
8 See Trout Point Lodge Ltd v Handshoe, 2012 NSSC 245 at paras 53-80, 1014 APR 22. 
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common law provinces (British Columbia,9 Manitoba,10 Saskatchewan11 and 
Newfoundland and Labrador12) have statutory torts of invasion of privacy, modelled 
loosely on the American common law.13 Quebec, too, has long had a civil action for 
invasion of privacy, stemming from its Charter of Rights and Freedoms.14 
 
But what of the privacy protection available to Canadians living in those 
jurisdictions that lack discrete privacy torts? This paper seeks to answer that question.  
I begin, in section two, by briefly identifying the key privacy interests (territorial, 
personal, and informational) that will form the basis of the remaining discussion. In 
section three, I then canvass a panoply of torts that have long been pressed into service 
to vindicate what courts here and in England have acknowledged to be invasions of 
these three privacy interests. From this examination we see that, despite the sometimes 
considerable effort of courts to protect privacy, this hodgepodge approach suffers from 
three significant limitations, which are explained in section four. First, there remain 
gaps in the protection of privacy. Second, invoking a hodgepodge of torts to protect 
privacy indirectly, rather than directly via a discrete privacy tort, causes conceptual 
and jurisdictional fragmentation. Finally, this approach is inherently confused and 
arguably unprincipled. A better way forward, I conclude, is for legislators or courts to 
act and create discrete privacy torts in those provinces that have not yet done so. 
 
2. Conceptualizing Privacy 
 
Forty years ago, the prominent philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson observed that the 
“most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any clear 
idea what it is”.15 Since then, there has been a vast outpouring of literature attempting 
to define the concept.16 Despite the many persistent and serious attempts at elucidation, 
privacy remains a deeply—arguably an essentially—contested concept.17 Although 
there is no consensus in the literature about what exactly privacy means, or which 
specific instances of invasion should be actionable, there is, nevertheless, broad 
agreement among most privacy scholars that the right to privacy must, at a higher level 
of abstraction, encompass two broad dimensions. The first concerns what may be 
                                                          
9 Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373. 
10 The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125. 
11 The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24. 
12 Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22. 
13 Supra note 6. 
14 For elucidation, see Aubry v Éditions Vice-Versa Inc, [1998] 1 SCR 591, 339 DLR (4th) 279. 
15 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right to Privacy” (1975) 4:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 295 at 295. 
16 For a recent examination of many leading theoretical approaches, see: Chris DL Hunt, “Conceptualizing 
Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational Considerations for the Development of Canada’s 
Fledgling Privacy Tort” (2011) 37:1 Queen’s LJ 167. 
17 One leading scholar lamented that he “sometimes despair[s] whether [privacy] can be usefully addressed 
at all”: Robert C Post, “Three Conceptions of Privacy” (2001) 89:6 Geo LJ 2087 at 2087; another remarked 
that privacy jurisprudence and theory is in “conceptual shambles”: WA Parent, “A New Definition of 
Privacy for the Law” (1983) 2:3 Law & Phil 305 at 305. 
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called freedom from the unwanted intrusion into private affairs and spaces, and this 
would capture matters such as unwanted physical touching, examining one’s banking 
records, or peering into private places. The second category concerns freedom from 
the unwanted disclosure of private information, such as the unauthorized posting of 
one’s diary on the internet.18 The essential disagreement among scholars is not that 
privacy must in principle encompass these two dimensions; rather, it is which types of 
intrusions and disclosures qualify as sufficiently private to merit protection. The 
resolution of that question (if such a resolution is even possible19) quite obviously falls 
outside the scope of this paper. 
 
For present organizational20 purposes, it is sufficient to adopt the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s taxonomy of privacy, as Justice Sharpe recently did for the 
unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones when deciding to create a new common 
law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.21 His Lordship noted that the Court has long 
recognized in its Charter jurisprudence three interrelated clusters of privacy 
interests.22 These serve to refine our thinking about privacy, if we bear in mind that 
each of these interests can, in principle, be invaded by both disclosures and 
intrusions.23 The first interest is territorial privacy. It “protects the home and other 
spaces where the individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy”.24 The second 
is personal privacy. Grounded in the individual’s bodily integrity, it protects the “right 
not to have our bodies touched or exposed to disclose objects or matters we wish to 
conceal”.25 Finally, there is informational privacy. In relation to this admittedly 
                                                          
18 Nicole Moreham, a leading privacy scholar in New Zealand, has recently observed that these two 
dimensions of privacy are widely accepted by most privacy scholars—see, for a list of many sources here, 
Nicole Moreham, “Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law” (2014) 73:2 Cambridge LJ 350 
at 3, n 10; cf Hunt, supra note 16 (discussing many theorists that recognize these two essential dimensions 
of privacy). 
19 One leading scholar, Daniel Solove, doubts whether it is possible or desirable to ascertain an abstract 
theoretical definition of privacy, and instead argues it is more productive to map privacy rights and invasions 
as they already exist: see Daniel Solove, “A Taxonomy of Privacy” (2006) 154:3 U Pa L Rev 477. 
20 It is important to bear in mind in the Supreme Court of Canada’s caution that these three privacy interests 
are simply “analytical tools, not strict or mutually exclusive categories” and that they may, and often do, 
overlap: R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 at para 35, 375 DLR (4th) 255 [Spencer]. 
21 Supra note 5 at para 41. 
22 Ibid, citing R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417, 73 Nfld & PEIR 13, and R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 
2 SCR 432. 
23 For example, in Jones itself the court determined that simply accessing the plaintiff’s banking records 
without permission constituted an intrusion into informational privacy. Had the defendant posted these 
records online, a clear case of disclosure would exist as well. Likewise, unauthorized entry into one’s 
bedroom would constitute a violation of territorial privacy; and, if photos were taken of the inside of one’s 
underwear drawer and published in a magazine, this territorial privacy claim would be offended by 
disclosure as well. 
24 Supra note 5 at para 41. 
25 Ibid. 
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“evanescent” concept,26 which is grounded in the notion that “information about an 
individual is in a fundamental way his own”, the Supreme Court has adopted the 
articulation put forth by the eminent privacy theorist Alan Westin, who described it as 
the “claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.27  
 
3. The Common Law’s Hodgepodge Protection of Privacy 
 
In this section, I adopt the above taxonomy of privacy interests, and examine, under 
the three broad headings of proprietary, personal, and informal privacy, various causes 
of action that courts in Canada and England have invoked to protect what are 
acknowledged to be invasions of privacy. 
 
(A) Intrusions into Property 
 
i. Trespass to Land 
 
Commentators have long noted that trespass can, in principle, provide a measure of 
privacy protection.28 This was acknowledged by Ellenborough CJ more than two 
centuries ago in Burdett v Abbott, wherein his Lordship, in the course of adjudicating 
a trespass action involving unauthorized entry into a home, noted that such behaviour 
offended the “private repose…every man [has] in his own house.”29  Similarly, in 
Merest v Harvey, another trespass case, Gibbs CJ said that exemplary damages could 
be awarded for the offense caused when a man intrudes on another’s property and 
peers into his windows.30 An Australian case has since followed suit, awarding 
exemplary damages in trespass to compensate the plaintiff’s hurt feelings where his 
privacy was invaded by the defendant who installed a secret microphone in his home.31 
A couple of recent Ontario cases have also pressed trespass into service to vindicate 
invasions of privacy. In Lipiec v Borsa,32 the defendants counterclaimed that their 
privacy was invaded when the plaintiffs repeatedly photographed them and installed a 
security camera on the plaintiff’s property to observe the defendants in their own yard. 
The court awarded $3000 in compensation for trespass and nuisance “occasioned by 
                                                          
26 Spencer, supra note 20 at para 35. 
27 Supra note 5 at para 41, citing R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 at para 23, [2004] 2 SCR 432, and Alan F 
Westin, Privacy and Freedom (London: The Bodley Head, 1967) at 7 
28 See David J Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy” (1983) 3:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 
325 at 334; UK, “Report of the Committee on Privacy”, Cmnd 5012 (1972) at 289; Brian Neill, “Privacy: 
A Challenge for the Next Century” in Basil S Markesinis, ed, Protecting Privacy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) at 4. 
29 Burdett v Abbott (1811), 104 ER 501 at 560. 
30 Merest v Harvey (1814), 128 ER 761. 
31 Greig v Greig, [1966] VR 376 (SC). 
32 Lipiec v Borsa, [1996] OJ No 3819, 17 OTC 64 [Lipiec]. 
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the deliberate invasion of…[the defendant’s] privacy”.33 Similarly, in Zorz v Attard,34 
damages were awarded to compensate the plaintiff whose privacy was invaded when 
the defendant constructed windows that looked directly into his home.35 
 
Although trespass has a certain robustness—being actionable per se, 
requiring neither intentional conduct36 nor proof of damages37—it suffers from 
significant limitations as a privacy remedy. To succeed, the claimant must be an 
“occupier”, meaning he has “possession” of the premises, which requires legal or de 
facto control of the property intruded upon.38 Hotel guests, lodgers in another’s house, 
and employees typically do not have sufficient possession to sue for trespass.39 A 
second limitation is that, as a matter of principle, trespass requires some physical entry 
onto property.40 It has thus been held in England that peering from the street into 
another’s house with binoculars,41 arranging mirrors on one’s property in order to see 
the private activities inside a neighbour’s home,42 and tapping someone’s telephone43 
are thus not actionable trespasses. To the extent that the Ontario cases referred to 
immediately above (Lipiec and Zorz) suggest otherwise, they are, with respect, 
wrongly decided. That said, the results in those cases can probably be explained by the 
fact that the claimants in each case bundled their arguments about privacy up with 
claims for both trespass and nuisance (the latter of which does not require physical 
                                                          
33 Ibid at para 18. 
34 Zorz v Attard, 2008 CanLII 2760 (ONSC) [Zorz]. 
35 Ibid at para 24. 
36 Trespass can be committed negligently, although it will not capture involuntary action such as falling onto 
property in an epileptic fit: see AM Jones & MA Dugdale, eds, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 19th ed, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) at 1111-12 [Clerk and Lindsell]; MVH Rogers, ed, Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort, 17th ed, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) at 620 [Winfield and Jolowicz]. 
37 Entick v Carrington, [1765] EWHC KB J98, 95 ER 807. 
38 See Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1115-17. 
39 See Winfield and Jolowicz, supra note 36 at 621, and cases cited therein. 
40 Two exceptions are that invading an occupier’s airspace by flying at an unreasonably low or unsafe height 
is a trespass (Bernstein v Skyviews, [1978] EWHC 479 (QB) [Bernstein]), and the unreasonable use of a 
public highway may constitute a trespass to one’s land adjacent to the highway (Hickman v Maisey, [1900] 
1 QB 752—in that case, trespass was committed by a man walking back and forth along the highway for 
hours to record racehorse trials on adjacent property). 
41 “Report of the Committee on Privacy”, supra note 28 at 289. 
42 See Seipp, supra note 28 at 337; Turner v Spooner (1861), 30 LJ Ch 801 at 803 (“[N]o doubt the owner 
of a house would prefer that a neighbour should not have the right of looking into his windows or yard; 
but…this Court…will not interfere on the mere ground of invasion of privacy”). 
43 Iain Christie, Nicole Moreham & Mark Warby, eds, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the 
Media, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 440, citing Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, [1979] 1 Ch 344 at 369 (the “eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass…nor 
can the ear”). 
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entry onto property), and the courts in each case failed to distinguish between these 
heads when awarding damages.44 
 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the two limits on this cause of action just 
discussed also mean that trespass is not available where the victim is in a public 
place,45 despite growing judicial46 and academic47 recognition that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy can exist in public.  
 
ii. Private Nuisance 
 
Private nuisance occurs when the defendant’s conduct unduly interferes with the 
claimant’s use or enjoyment of his land.48 In J Lyons & Sons Ltd v Wilkins,49 an early 
decision of the English Court of Appeal, it was said that an actionable nuisance could 
be pleaded if a person “watches and besets” another’s house in order to compel him to 
act in a certain way. Later, in Bernstein v Skyviews, an English case concerning the 
photographing of the plaintiff’s property from an airplane, Griffiths J said it would be 
a “monstrous invasion of…privacy” actionable in nuisance if the defendant subjected 
the claimant to “constant surveillance of his house from the air, accompanied by the 
photographing of his every activity”.50 Several Canadian cases have also accepted that 
nuisance actions can be used to vindicate invasions of privacy in the absence of a 
discrete common law or statutory privacy tort. A notorious example is Motherwell v 
Motherwell,51 in which the Alberta Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs, who were 
subjected to repeated harassing telephone calls at their home, had “established a claim 
in nuisance by invasion of privacy through the abuse of the system of telephone 
communications”.52 An Ontario court has since come to the same conclusion, in a case 
of harassing calls made to a man’s business.53 As mentioned above, Canadian courts 
have also found actionable nuisances where one neighbour installs cameras to record 
                                                          
44 See supra note 32 at para 19; supra note 34 at para 24. 
45 Jonathan Morgan, “Privacy, Confidence and Horizontal Effect: ‘Hello’ Trouble” (2003) 62:2 Cambridge 
LJ 444 at 460. 
46 See supra note 2; Von Hannover v Germany, No 59320/00, [2004] ECHR 294, 40 EHRR 1; supra note 
14, from England, the European Court of Human Rights, and Canada, respectively. 
47 See: Andrew Jay McClurg, “Bringing Privacy Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions 
in Public Places” (1995) 73 NCL Rev 989; Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, “Privacy and the Reasonable 
Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places” (2000) 50:3 UTLJ 305; Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in 
Public Places” (2006) 65:3 Cambridge LJ 606. 
48 See Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1162; Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, [1997] UKHL 14 [Hunter]. 
49 J Lyons & Sons Ltd v Wilkins, [1899] 1 Ch 255 [J Lyons & Sons]. 
50 Bernstein, supra note 40 at para 7. 
51 Motherwell v Motherwell, [1976] AJ No 555, 73 DLR (3d) 62. 
52 Ibid at para 52. 
53 Provincial Partitions Inc v Ashcor Inplant Structures Ltd, 41 ACWS (3d) 823 at para 72, 50 CPR (3d) 
497. 
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the activities of another.54 In Saelman v Hill, in which a surveillance camera was aimed 
at a neighbour’s driveway, the court observed more broadly that such “conduct may 
be labelled as…invasion of privacy” and is in “essence [a] manifestation of the well-
established tort of nuisance”.55 The same reasoning was recently followed in a British 
Columbia Court, notwithstanding the fact that that province has a discrete statutory 
privacy tort that would ostensibly capture the surveillance at issue.56 
 
Although nuisance is wider than trespass in that it does not require physical 
entry onto property,57 the action nevertheless suffers from similar limitations as a 
privacy remedy. First, as in trespass, the claimant must be an owner or occupier of the 
land with a right to possession.58 Second, compensation for personal distress is 
probably not recoverable in nuisance.59  Thus, as Morgan notes, if Griffiths J’s 
example in Bernstein actually arose, the claimant would have to point to some decrease 
in the amenity value of the land and would receive compensation only in relation to 
that lost value.60 This is, of course, “quite different from compensating the invasion of 
privacy in itself”.61 Finally, on plain reading, the “watching and besetting” principle 
from J Lyons & Sons requires proof the defendant has a specific intent to influence the 
claimant’s behaviour,62 which would not typically be the case where the defendant’s 
motive is simply voyeuristic or, by definition, where he acted surreptitiously. 
 
(B) Interference with Privacy of the Person  
 
i. Public Nuisance 
 
                                                          
54 See supra note 32 at para 19; supra note 34 at para 24. 
55 Saelman v Hill, [2004] OJ No 2122 at para 36, 131 ACWS (3d) 367 (Ont SC). 
56 See Suzuki v Munroe, 2009 BCSC 1403 at paras 1, 99, 181 ACWS (3d) 828 [Suzuki]; cf Privacy Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 373 s 1. 
57 See Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1162. 
58 Ibid at 1179, 1187, citing Hunter, supra note 48 which overruled the Court of Appeal’s holding that a 
mere licensee and child in her parents’ home, without a legal right of possession, had standing to sue in 
nuisance.   
59 Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1179 (noting no English case has ever made such an award); cf 
Hunter, supra note 48 (Rejecting the suggestion that personal injury or loss of personal enjoyment are 
compensable in nuisance. This is because nuisance is concerned with protecting property values, not the 
emotional well-being of occupants).  
60 Indeed, this is precisely—and correctly—how the court in Suzuki, supra note 56 at paras 99-102, 
calculated the damages flowing from unreasonable surveillance by one neighbour of another. 
61 Supra note 45 at 459. 
62 “Report of the Committee on Privacy”, supra note 28 at 292. 
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A public nuisance arises whenever the defendant’s conduct “materially affects the 
comfort and convenience of life of a class of the public”.63 When compared to the torts 
just discussed, public nuisance has some increased potential for protecting privacy, as 
it applies to public places and it does not require the claimant to show that an interest 
in property has been affected. Public nuisance was pleaded successfully in Ontario 
(Attorney-General) v Dieleman,64 a case involving aggressive anti-abortion protesters, 
who were enjoined from protesting within 500 feet of various abortion clinics and in 
front of the houses of certain doctors. The Court emphasized, in relation to both of 
these sets of interlocutory injunctions that were issued, that the protection of privacy 
was an “integral component” of the patients’ reasonable use of the clinics, and of the 
doctors’ use and enjoyment of their residential homes.65  
 
Despite this promise, the action suffers from one significant limitation: the 
claimant must prove that a sufficient class of Her Majesty’s subjects is affected by the 
impugned behaviour.66 Consequently, invasions of privacy targeted at specific 
individuals will generally not constitute a public nuisance,67 although, in Canada 
(unlike in England68), there is some authority for the proposition that courts can add 
up individual private nuisances to find a public nuisance.69  
 
ii. Trespass to the Person 
 
Trespass to the person can take three forms, each of which is actionable per se: assault, 
battery, and false imprisonment. The second of these applies straightforwardly where 
one’s privacy is invaded by physical touching.  In one Ontario case, MacKay v 
Buelow,70 the court awarded both general and punitive damages to the plaintiff who 
suffered an “invasion of privacy” through the constant harassment, some of which was 
physical, by her ex-husband.71   
 
In practice, however, this tort will often be of limited utility for vindicating 
many types of invasion of privacy. As some physical contact is required to prove 
battery, photography will not generally be actionable.72 Assault is also limited, as the 
                                                          
63 Winfield and Jolowicz, supra note 36 at 643. 
64 Ontario (Attorney-General) v Dieleman (1994), 117 DLR (4th) 449, 49 ACWS (3d) 1059 (Ont SC). 
65 Ibid at paras 668, 693. 
66 A v PYA Quarries, [1958] EWCA Civ 1, [1957] 2 QB 169 (the size of the class is fact-dependant and case 
specific, at 184). 
67 “Report of the Committee on Privacy”, supra note 28 at 291. 
68 Winfield and Jolowicz, supra note 36 at 643, citing R v Rimmington, [2005] UKHL 63 (rejecting the 
notion that individual private nuisances can add up to a public nuisance). 
69 See supra note 64 at para 415. 
70 MacKay v Buelow, [1995] OJ No 867, 24 CCLT (2d) 184. 
71 Ibid at para 16. 
72 Kaye v Robertson, [1990] EWCA Civ 21, [1991] FSR 62 [Kaye] (photography using flash bulb is not 
battery, although Glidewell LJ, at 68, was “prepared to accept that it may well be the case that if a bright 
[2015] COMMON LAW’S HODGEPODGE  
 
 
 
169 
claimant must apprehend an immediate unlawful touching,73 which will often not be 
the case where the intrusion is purely voyeuristic or conducted surreptitiously. 
 
iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
In Wilkinson v Downton,74 the claimant obtained damages for emotional upset where 
the defendant, playing a practical joke, falsely informed her that her husband had been 
seriously injured.  Commentators have long noted that this action could, in principle, 
be used to capture various types of serious privacy invasions.75 Indeed, this was one 
of the central arguments advanced in Wainwright v Home Office,76 a recent decision 
of the House of Lords. In that case, the claimants were strip-searched while visiting a 
relative at an English prison. The trial judge held that this amounted to a serious 
invasion of privacy and determined that Wilkinson could provide relief where privacy 
was intentionally invaded and emotional upset resulted.77 The House of Lords 
subsequently reversed this decision, however. Lord Hoffmann, for the Court, held that 
the Wilkinson tort does not apply to mere distress; rather, to be actionable, the upset 
suffered must constitute actual harm in the sense that it amounts to a recognized 
psychiatric injury.78  
 
As long as this actual harm requirement remains a requisite element,79 the tort 
will be of very limited utility to all but the most sensitive of victims.80 Simply put, 
very few invasions of privacy will cause distress amounting to a psychiatric illness. 
 
iv. A Tort of Harassment? 
 
Courts in Ontario and British Columbia have on several occasions considered whether 
an independent common law tort of harassment exists. While the status of such a tort 
                                                          
light is deliberately shone into another person’s eyes and…damages him in some…way, this may be in law 
a battery”). 
73 Collins v Wilcock, [1984] 1 WLR 1172 at 1178. 
74 Wilkinson v Downton, [1897] 2 QB 57 [Wilkinson]. 
75 Peter Burns, “The Law and Privacy: The Canadian Experience” (1976) 54:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 20. 
76 The unreported trial judgment is summarised by Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright v Home Office, [2003] 
UKHL 53 at paras 2-12, [2003] 3 WLR 1137. 
77 See ibid at para 11. 
78 Supra note 76 at paras 41, 47; cf Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust, [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at paras 
11-12, [2003] 3 All ER 932.  
79 No Canadian case has affirmatively eschewed this requirement, although some commentators have argued 
that distressful violations of a person’s dignity ought to be actionable, even if no physical or psychiatric 
harm is suffered: HJ Glasbeek, “Outraged Dignity—Do We Need a New Tort?” (1968) 6 Alta L Rev 77 at 
91-94. 
80 Angus Johnston, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse? Privacy and the Wainwrights” (2004) 63:1 
Cambridge LJ 15 at 18 (the House’s decision consigns this tort to the “category of historical interest”).  
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is dubious,81 at best, if one were to be clearly recognized it could provide some 
measure of relief to those whose privacy is invaded.82 Of course, the extent of this 
protection would depend on the precise elements of the tort, and it is not possible at 
this point to do more than speculate what these would be, given the uncertain status of 
the tort itself. That said, one place to look is Mainland Sawmills Ltd v IWA-Canada, 
Local 1-3567 Society,83 a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court. There, the 
court assumed, without deciding, that there could be a tort of harassment, and 
suggested this action would require: (i) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (ii) 
intention of causing or reckless disregard of causing emotional distress; (iii) the 
plaintiff's suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress (i.e., emotional distress of 
such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable person in a civilized 
society should be expected to endure it); and (iv) causation, meaning the defendant’s 
conduct was the actual and approximate cause of the emotional distress suffered by 
the plaintiff. 
 
While the above framing does suggest a slightly lower standard than the 
Wilkinson tort (just discussed), insofar as “distress” here does not seem to require 
actual physical or psychiatric harm, it nevertheless contemplates that such distress be 
severe or extreme. That, coupled with the requirement that the conduct be 
“outrageous”, suggests the tort would likely not be available in any but the most 
serious cases of invasion of privacy. Furthermore, it seems sensible that any such 
harassment tort ought to require a series of acts before harassment is made out 
(although that is not mentioned in Mainland Sawmills), for harassment itself is 
typically conceptualized as involving more than a single incident.84 Indeed, in 
England, which has a statutory harassment tort, the claimant must show the defendant 
engaged in a “course of conduct”.85 If this requirement were adopted in Canada, it 
would likely mean a single invasion of privacy—however extreme—would not be 
actionable, thus limiting the tort’s utility for vindicating some invasions of privacy. 
 
(C) Invasions of Privacy by Disclosing Private Information 
                                                          
81 Ontario courts have rejected the existence of this tort in Guillaume v Toronto (City), 2010 ONSC 5045, 
193 ACWS (3d) 44 and Lynch v Westario Power Inc, [2009] OJ No 2927 at para 66 (Ont SC). In British 
Columbia there is mixed authority: Canadian Tire Bank v Roach, 2006 BCPC 120 and Toban v Total Credit 
Recovery (BC) Ltd, 2001 BCPC 465, 152 ACWS (3d) 633 were decided on the assumption this tort exists, 
but in 510267 BC Ltd v Gilmore, 2005 BCSC 756, 140 ACWS (3d) 120 and Campbell v Wellfund Audio-
Visual Ltd (1995), 14 CCEL (2d) 240, 58 ACWS (3d) 64 (BCSC) the courts rejected the existence of any 
discrete harassment tort. 
82 Indeed, in England, where a statutory harassment tort was recently created (The Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (UK), c 40), courts have enjoined defendants from surreptitiously videotaping a 
person without her knowledge: Howlett v Holding, [2006] EWHC 41 (QB). For a discussion of cases 
applying this act to vindicate various invasions of privacy—including the publication of private 
information—see Mark Thomson & Nicola McCann, “Harassment and the Media” (2009) 1 J Media L 149. 
83 Mainland Sawmills Ltd v IWA-Canada, Local 1-3567 Society, 2006 BCSC 1195, 152 ACWS (3d) 543 
[Mainland Sawmills]. 
84 Harassment is defined as involving conduct or actions that are usually “repeated” or “persistent”: Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 10th ed, sub verbo “harassment”. 
85 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, supra note 82, s 1.  
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i. Malicious Falsehood 
 
Kaye v Robertson exemplifies the lengths to which common law courts have been 
willing to press existing torts into service to remedy serious invasions of privacy.86 In 
that case, the celebrity claimant was injured in a car accident. The defendant, a tabloid 
journalist, photographed Kaye in his hospital room. He intended to publish these 
photographs in an article about Kaye’s injury and recovery, which was written as a 
bedside “interview”.  Kaye, being semi-conscious, was incapable of consenting to 
this.87 Bingham LJ characterized this intrusion as a “monstrous invasion 
of…privacy”.88 Because no tort of invasion of privacy existed in England at that 
time—something each Judge lamented89—Kaye sought to press his claim into a 
variety of other actions. After rejecting several actions as inapplicable, the court held 
that malicious falsehood could apply.90 The elements are: (i) the defendant has 
published words about the claimant, which are false; (ii) he did so maliciously; and 
(iii) the claimant suffered special damage as a result.91 However, special damage need 
not be proved if the defendant’s words were calculated to cause pecuniary loss.92 The 
impugned article was held to imply that Kaye consented to the “interview”, which, in 
light of his incapacity, could not have been true. Regarding the second element, the 
court held that since the tabloid must have known Kaye was incapable of consenting 
to the “interview”, implying otherwise in the article would “inevitably be malicious.”93 
Regarding the third element, the court reasoned that Kaye’s story was of economic 
value to him, as he could sell it to the highest tabloid bidder; and the defendant’s 
unauthorized publication would “seriously lessen[]” this value, since the first telling 
is the most desirable.94 The action was proved and an injunction issued. 
 
Despite the claimant Kaye’s success, the limits of malicious falsehood as a 
privacy remedy are obvious. By requiring the publication to be false, the action fails 
to capture the essence of most privacy claims—i.e, that true private information has 
been disclosed. Indeed, as it turned out, the defendant was able to circumvent the 
                                                          
86 See supra note 72 at 70 (Bingham LJ emphasized this point). 
87 Ibid at 64. 
88 Ibid at 70; cf Leggatt LJ at 71 and Glidewell LJ at 66 (both Lords acknowledged invasion of privacy was 
the essence of the complaint).  
89 See, especially, the comments ibid of Bingham LJ at 70, and also those of Leggatt LJ at 71 and Glidewell 
LJ at 66. 
90 An interlocutory injunction was issued preventing publication of anything suggesting Kaye had consented 
to the article or photographs. 
91 Supra note 72 at 67. 
92 Ibid at 67; Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1486. 
93 Supra note 72 at 68. 
94 Ibid. 
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injunction issued in Kaye by augmenting the story to note the plaintiff had not in fact 
consented to the interview or to the taking of the photographs.95 Additionally, the third 
element, which reflects the economic rather than dignitary basis of malicious 
falsehood,96 means invasions of privacy are not actionable unless some economic harm 
has been intended or suffered—again, this puts the tort beyond the reach of many 
ordinary (as opposed to celebrity) claimants, who will simply not be able to satisfy 
this requirement.  
 
ii. Defamation 
 
Defamation actions are aimed at vindicating the claimant’s reputation.  There is 
widespread agreement among courts that, like privacy, reputation is a dignitary 
interest.97 Courts have occasionally noted this conceptual symmetry between privacy 
and reputation—indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada has remarked that these rights 
are “intimately related”.98 Many academic commentators have offered similar views.99 
 
Tolley v Fry is an old English case in which the House of Lords was able to 
remedy an invasion of privacy indirectly by using the tort of defamation.100 The 
claimant, Tolley, was an amateur golfer of some repute, who was upset that the 
defendant, Fry, a chocolatier, had used his image in an advertisement without 
permission. The House determined that the defamation claim was made out because, 
by using his image, Fry had falsely implied that Tolley had endorsed the defendant’s 
product, which further implied that Tolley had accepted some payment for doing so. 
These implications, the Court held, were defamatory because they could tarnish 
Tolley’s status as an amateur golfer.101 Interestingly, in Kaye (discussed immediately 
                                                          
95 Basil S Markesinis, “Our Patchy Law of Privacy—Time to Do Something About It” (1990) 53:6 Mod L 
Rev 802. Bingham LJ, writing extra-judicially after the Kaye case, noted the newspaper lawfully published 
the “interview”, “boasting of the fact that it had been obtained without Mr. Kaye’s consent”: Thomas 
Bingham, “Should There Be A Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?” (1996) 5 Eur HRL Rev 450 at 
457. 
96 See Clerk and Lindsell, supra note 36 at 1479-80 . 
97 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd (1999), [2001] 2 AC 127 at 201, [1999] 4 All ER 609 (HL) (“Reputation 
is an integral…part of [a person’s] dignity”); Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 
at paras 120-23, 126 DLR (4th) 129 [Hill] (“[R]eputation…serves the…fundamentally important purpose 
of fostering our self-image and sense of self worth…. [R]eputation…represents and reflects the innate 
dignity of the individual”); cf Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75 at 92, 86 S Ct 669 (1966). 
98 Hill, ibid at para 121; cf Roberson v Rochester Folding Box Co, 64 AD 30 at 33-34, 71 NYS 876 (1901) 
in which the court observed that it saw “no distinction in principle” between injuring one’s reputation and 
invading one’s privacy; cf supra note 8 at paras 53-80. 
99 See, for elaboration, Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) at 22-3; Robert C Post, “The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort” (1989) 77:5 Cal L Rev 957 at 964; Michael Tugendhat & Iain Christie, eds, The Law of Privacy 
and the Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 92; William Prosser, “Privacy” (1960) 48 Cal L 
Rev 383 at 389. 
100 Tolley v JS Fry & Sons, [1931] AC 333 (HL(Eng)) [Tolley]. 
101 See “Report of the Committee on Privacy”, supra note 28 at 288 (Tolley, ibid is the “nearest the law of 
defamation ever came to protecting ‘privacy’ as such”); cf Percy Winfield, “Privacy” (1931) 47 Law Q Rev 
23 at 33-35 (Arguing in an article written before the House rendered its decision in Tolley that the case was 
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above), two member of the English Court of Appeal showed some willingness to apply 
Tolley on the facts before it, despite acknowledging the essence of Kaye’s complaint 
was invasion of privacy, not reputational harm.102 In Monson v Tussauds,103 an earlier 
English case that commentators have said is really about privacy,  not reputation,104 
the claimant, who had been acquitted of murder, obtained an order compelling a wax 
museum to remove an effigy of himself on the basis of defamation.105  
 
Canadian cases of more recent vintage have also invoked defamation to 
vindicate invasions of privacy. One example, which parallels Monson, concerned a 
high school principal’s successful defamation suit again the Nanaimo Teacher’s 
Association. The defendant had circulated newsletters depicting the plaintiff in a 
caricatured manner, making a vulgar gesture and holding out his hand for money. The 
trial judge found the image to be defamatory, and observed that a “newspaper is not 
entitled to invade private life in order to discuss questions of character with which the 
public is not concerned”.106 More recently, in Trout Point Lodge Ltd v Handshoe,107 
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court awarded general, aggravated, and punitive damages 
to the plaintiff, who was defamed by the defendant’s acts of posting multiple 
homophobic statements as well as doctored sexual images of him online. Relying on 
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s contemporaneous decision in Jones,108 the plaintiff had 
also argued invasion of privacy as an independent claim. Justice Hood appeared 
receptive to the plaintiff’s argument, but ultimately declined to adjudicate the privacy 
claim on the merits (though she did suggest that a Nova Scotia court can recognize a 
common law privacy tort in the future).109 Importantly, her Ladyship observed that the 
invasion of privacy the plaintiff suffered in this case could be remedied by the 
                                                          
really concerned with a “discreditable intrusion on individual privacy” and urging the House to recognize 
an independent privacy tort rather than rely on defamation). 
102 Supra note 72, Glidewell LJ at 67 and Bingham LJ at 70 found it arguable the publication was libellous. 
103 Monson v Tussauds Ltd, [1894] 1 QB 671 (CA) [Monson]. 
104 See Anonymous, “Is This Libel? More About Privacy” (1894) 7 Harv L Rev 492. The aspect of privacy 
covered by defamation here is more naturally covered under the tort of misappropriation of personality, 
which is discussed in further detail below. 
105 Interestingly, two of the judges also denounced the practice of newspaper journalists and museum 
exhibitors detailing even truthful incidents of peoples’ private lives: supra note 103 at 678 (Matthew J), 697 
(Lord Halsbury), discussed in David J Seipp, “English Judicial Recognition of a Right to Privacy” (1983) 
3:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 325 at 344. 
106 Mitchell v Nanaimo District Teachers’ Assn, [1993] BCWLD 785, 1993 CanLII 1751 (SC). 
107 Supra note 8. 
108 Supra note 5. 
109 See supra note 8 at para 55. 
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accompanying defamation action, which motivated her to simply proceed down that 
well-worn jurisprudential path.110 
 
Despite these creative judicial efforts, defamation suffers from serious 
limitations as a privacy remedy. The requirement that information be false means true 
statements are not actionable.  Additionally, because defamation is concerned with the 
claimant’s public reputation,111 actionability requires proof that the false publication 
would “tend to lower [the claimant] in the estimation of right-thinking members of 
society generally”.112 We can imagine many privacy invasions that would not satisfy 
this requirement, such as where the information is of a salutary—but nevertheless 
intimate—nature.113 
 
iii. Breach of Confidence 
 
Breach of confidence is an ancient equitable cause of action. In Coco v AN Clark 
(Engineers) Ltd, which is often taken as the seminal restatement of the action in its 
modern form,114 Megarry J traced its origins back to a 16th century couplet of Sir 
Thomas Moore who, in a passage that emphasizes the conscience based, relationship-
centric focus of the doctrine, said “confidence is the cousin of trust”.115  In Attorney 
General v Observer Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed the following formulation as set 
out by Megarry J in Coco: 
 
First, the information itself…must 'have the necessary quality of confidence 
about it.' Secondly, that information must have been imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must 
be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it.116 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has also accepted the above formulation.117 
 
                                                          
110 Ibid at para 80. Note that Justice Hood at para 79 emphasized as well that reputation and privacy are 
intimately related. 
111 Supra note 45 at 458; see also Raymond Wacks, Protection of Privacy (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1980) at 17 (“The plaintiff ought not be barred from recovery when the disclosure does not affect the esteem 
in which he is held”). 
112 Sim v Stretch, [1936] 2 All ER 1237, quoted in supra note 45 at 458; cf Winfield, supra note 101 at 40 
(defamation’s concern for the claimant’s public reputation makes it insufficient as a privacy remedy); cf 
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193 at 197-8 (Defamation 
injures the individual in his external relations—how others view him; privacy concerns a man’s “estimate 
of himself”). 
113 Such as zoom-lens targeting of a celebrity parent playing with their child in a park. 
114 That is, before the action was reworked again by the House of Lords in supra note 2, which I discuss 
further below. 
115 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd, [1968] FSR 415 (Ch) at 419 [Coco]. 
116 Attorney General v Observer Ltd, [1990] 1 AC 109 at 268 (HL).   
117 LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, [1989] 2 SCR 574, 61 DLR (4th) 14. 
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Breach of confidence, in this classical form, has long provided a measure of 
protection for the unwanted disclosure of private information. In Argyll v Argyll, for 
example, Ungoed-Thomas J enjoined the defendant from disclosing information 
relating to his former wife’s “private life, personal affairs or private conduct” 
communicated in the course of marriage.118 Similar results have been obtained in other 
cases involving secrets shared in non-marital relationships, on the basis that when 
information is entrusted to a person for a limited purpose, it will be unconscionable 
and hence inequitable for the recipient to subsequently disclose it.119 It has also long 
been the case that an obligation of equitable confidence can extend to third parties if 
they receive information from an individual who is herself under an equitable duty of 
confidence. This can be seen in Prince Albert v Strange, a case in which Prince Albert 
entrusted private etchings of himself and Queen Victoria to a printer, who then gave 
these to a third party who sought to publish them without permission. Lord Cottenham 
issued an injunction on the basis that the third party was impressed with an obligation 
of confidence because the etchings were initially shared in confidence between the 
Prince and his printer.120 
 
Breach of confidence (in its classical form, which remains the law in Canada) 
suffers from two serious limitations as a privacy remedy. The first is that the doctrine 
depends on there being a confidential relationship in fact in which information is 
voluntarily communicated.121 This is because, as Browne-Wilkinson VC said in one 
leading case, “[i]t is the acceptance of the information on the basis that it will be kept 
secret that affects the conscience of the recipient of the information”,122 and this, in 
turn, affords equity the jurisdiction to intervene.123 This requirement of an antecedent 
relationship of confidence considerably limits the circumstances in which this 
                                                          
118 Argyll v Argyll, [1967] Ch. 302 at 317, [1965] 1 All ER 611.  
119 See e.g. Stephens v Avery, [1988] Ch 449, [1988] 2 All ER 477 456 [Stephens]; Barrymore (Michael) v 
NGN Ltd, [1997] FSR 600 (Ch). 
120 Prince Albert v Strange, (1849) 18 LJ Ch 120, 41 ER 1171; see supra note 2 at para 45 for this 
interpretation of Prince Albert. 
121 To be sure, several English cases have imposed obligations of confidence on complete strangers, who 
obtain information notwithstanding the absence of an antecedent relationship of confidence. These cases 
have been criticized in detail in Chris DL Hunt, “Rethinking Surreptitious Taking in the Law of Confidence” 
(2011) 1 Intellectual Property Q 66. Further discussion of this point would require considerable space, and 
falls largely outside the scope of this paper. 
122 Stephens, supra note 119 at 456; cf the Law Commission for England and Wales summarised its view by 
noting obligations of confidence arise where information is “entrusted” by one person to another (UK, Law 
Commission, Breach of Confidence (No 110) (London: The Stationary Office, 1981) at para 2.2) [Breach 
of Confidence]; cf Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom Under the Human Rights Act 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 736 (obligation of confidence depends, classically, on an 
agreement to keep information confidential). 
123 Mussen v Van Diemen’s Land Co (1937), [1938] Ch 253 at 261, [1938] 1 All ER 210 (“The basis, and 
the whole basis…of all equitable relief—is that that it is against conscience”); Re Diplock’s Estate, [1948] 
Ch 465 at 488, [1948] 2 All ER 31 (“An equitable claim predicates that the conscience of the defendant 
must be affected”). 
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equitable action can apply, for it would not—in its classical formulation, at least—
extend to a complete stranger who is not himself in a relationship of confidence with 
the claimant, or who do not obtain information from someone else who was in such a 
relationship.124 The second limitation inherent in breach of confidence is that the action 
is concerned, essentially, with the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. 
Accordingly, it does not extend—at least historically—to capture bare intrusions into 
private places.125  
 
These two limits no longer constrain breach of confidence in England. The 
first limit was removed by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN, a case in which a 
supermodel claimant sued a tabloid for breach of confidence in relation to photographs 
it took and subsequently published which showed her emerging from a Narcotics 
Anonymous meeting. A majority of the House of Lords decided in Campbell’s favour, 
even though no relationship of confidence existed between Campbell and the 
paparazzo who took the photograph. The court was able to reach this result by 
changing the test so that the second Coco element is no longer a prerequisite to 
recovery.  Now, the action can extend to complete strangers solely on the basis that 
the information or activities that are accessed and subsequently disclosed are 
“private”.126 Regarding the second limit discussed above, it too appears to have been 
overcome through an “expansive interpretation” of when information has been 
“misused”.127 This occurred in Tchenguiz v Imerman, in which the Court of Appeal 
determined there had been an actionable breach of confidence where the defendant 
had accessed and copied the claimant’s private records without permission, even 
though he had not subsequently disclosed them. 128 Accordingly, in England at least, 
breach of confidence may now capture some types of bare intrusions.129 
 
While these two developments may be desirable from a privacy perspective 
(insofar as they expand the reach of equitable confidence, thereby capturing more 
privacy invasions), they do come at the expense of doctrinal coherence. Scholars have 
criticized the approach in Campbell on the basis that dropping the second Coco 
                                                          
124 These arguments have been elaborated on in Hunt, supra note 121. 
125 See ibid for a discussion. Cf Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of 
Confidential Information, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 15.02, 15.18-15.23. 
126 Supra note 2 at paras 14, 20 (per Lord Nicholls), 46-51 (per Lord Hoffmann), 85 (per Lord Hope), 134 
(per Baroness Hale), 165 (per Lord Carswell); cf Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 6), [2005] EWCA Civ 595 at 
para 83, [2005] 3 WLR 881 [Douglas]. For a modern restatement of the action, which requires the claimant 
to show that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information or activities in 
question, see Murray v Express Newspapers Plc, [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2008] 3 WLR 1360. 
127 Moreham, supra note 18 at 360. 
128 See Tchenguiz & Ors v Imerman, [2010] EWCA Civ 908 at paras 68-69, [2011] 2 WLR 592. 
129 It is not clear whether this amplified (and some would say artificial) concept of “misuse” extends beyond 
cases where private information is accessed. There has been some suggestion that accessing a person by 
taking their photograph in a harassing manner could violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which guides the development of the English breach of confidence action: Wood v Commissioner of 
Police for the Metropolis, [2009] EWCA Civ 414 at para 34, [2010] WLR 123. 
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requirement does violence to the equitable underpinnings of classical confidence.130 
This is because classical confidence, being an equitable doctrine, depends for its 
jurisdiction upon the conscience of the recipient of information being affected, which 
is not the case unless he has been entrusted with the information initially, or acquired 
the information from someone else in such a relationship.131 Regarding the expansive 
interpretation of “misuse”, it appears to stretch the ordinary meaning of that word to 
apply it to capture scenarios where no use at all has been made of the information, as 
would be the case in many instances of bare intrusions (such as a Peeping Tom, say). 
An additional conceptual objection can be levelled against the English approach: by 
shoehorning privacy claims into the equitable breach of confidence action, it has the 
potential to confuse the different policies underpinning each claim, and hence the 
principled development of each doctrine. Recognition of this led a majority of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal to reject the approach endorsed in Campbell and to create a 
new privacy tort instead.132 The majority observed: 
 
Privacy and confidence are different concepts. To press every case calling 
for a remedy for unwarranted exposure of information about the private 
lives of individuals into a cause of action having as its foundation trust and 
confidence will be to confuse those concepts.133 
 
For these reasons, it would be preferable, in my view, for Canadian courts in those 
provinces without discrete privacy actions to eschew the English breach of confidence 
approach, and instead simply proclaim the existence of an independent privacy tort. 
This is, of course, what the Ontario Court of Appeal did recently in Jones. 
Interestingly, Justice Sharpe’s justification for doing so parallels the House of Lords’ 
rationale for modifying breach of confidence to better protect privacy in Campbell.134 
                                                          
130 See Ayre Schreiber, “Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy Should be 
Independently Recognised by English Law”, (2006) Intellectual Property Q 160 at 170-76; Nicole 
Moreham, “Douglas and Others v Hello! Ltd—the Protection of Privacy in English Private Law” (2001) 
64:5 Mod L Rev 767 at 770; Rachael Mulheron, “A Potential Framework for Privacy? A Reply to Hello!” 
(2006) 69:5 Mod L Rev 679 at 684-87; A Sims, “A Shift in the Centre of Gravity: The Dangers of Protecting 
Privacy through Breach of Confidence” (2005) Intellectual Property Q 27 at 33-34; Russell Brown, 
“Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 589 at 611-12. 
131 See Stephens, supra note 119 at 456; cf the Law Commission for England and Wales summarized its 
view by noting obligations of confidence arise where information is “entrusted” by one person to another 
(Breach of Confidence, supra note 122 at para 2.2). cf Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom 
Under the Human Rights Act (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 736 (obligation of confidence 
depends, classically, on an agreement to keep information confidential). For a detailed discussion about 
how the modification in Campbell is not consistent with classical confidence, see Hunt, supra note 121. 
132 Hosking v Runting, [2004] NZCA 34 at para 48, [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Supra note 5. Justice Sharpe’s justification for creating a privacy tort in Jones parallels the House of 
Lords’ rationale for modifying breach of confidence to protect privacy in Campbell. In Jones, Sharpe J drew 
upon the doctrine of Charter values (and in particular, privacy rights under s 8 of the Charter) to 
incrementally develop the common law (at para 45). In Campbell, Lord Hoffmann invoked the principle of 
“horizontality”, which holds that Courts should develop the common law consistently with the rights 
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 iv. Appropriation of Personality 
 
The four common law provinces with statutory privacy torts each expressly capture 
within their respective ambits what is often referred to, loosely, as the “appropriation 
of personality”. These statutes are based on the American common law, as reflected 
in the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, which also has a tort of misappropriation 
of personality.135 In Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador, 
appropriation refers to the unauthorized use of one’s name or likeness or voice, and 
these are treated in the respective Acts as specific examples of the more general tort 
of invasion of privacy.136 In British Columbia, appropriation is treated as a separate 
“special” tort,137 not as an example of the general tort of invasion of privacy; and 
appropriation does not appear to cover the use of another’s voice, but rather is limited 
to the unauthorized use of one’s name or portrait, with the latter including a 
caricature.138 Importantly, in all four of these provinces, appropriation also requires 
that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s “personality” be for the purposes of 
advertising or other commercial gain.139  
 
Courts in Ontario have long recognized a common law equivalent to the 
above statutory torts. The seminal case is Krouse v Chrysler Canada Ltd.140 Although 
the action failed on the facts in that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized in 
principle that appropriation of personality could be actionable at common law in 
appropriate circumstances.141 The opportunity to do so came several years later in 
                                                          
conferred under the European Court of Human Rights (including the right to respect for private life under 
article 8): see supra note 2 at para 51. 
135 Supra note 6 at s 652 (A-D). 
136 The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125, s 3(c) [Privacy MB]; The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24, s 3(c) [Privacy 
SK]; Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22, s 4(c) [Privacy NL]. 
137 David Vaver, “What’s Mine is Not Yours: Commercial Appropriation of Personality Under the Privacy 
Acts of British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan” (1981) 15 UBC L Rev 241 at 254. 
138 Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373, s 3 [Privacy BC]. 
139 Privacy MB, supra note 136 s 3(c); Privacy SK, supra note 136 s 3(c); Privacy NL, s 4(c); Privacy BC, 
ibid, s 4(2). For a further discussion of these statutes, see: Amy M Conroy, “Protecting Your Personality 
Rights In Canada: A Matter of Property or Privacy?”, online: (2012) 1:1 U Western Ontario J Leg Studies 
3 <ir.lib.uwo.ca/uwojls/vol1/iss1/3>. The requirement of commercial gain derives from the fact that these 
torts reflect a mixture of both privacy rights and property rights—indeed, this probably explains why in the 
British Columbia legislation appropriation is treated separately from the more general tort of invasion of 
privacy, with the implication that an action may be made out even where there is nothing “private” about 
the information at all. Scholars have long noted that appropriation involves this mixture of property concepts 
with notions of privacy, and several have argued that these torts should be understood in purely economic 
terms, as they really have little to do with privacy per se: see e.g: Robert C Post, “Rereading Warren and 
Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation” (1991) 41 Case W Res L Rev 647; Des Butler, “A Tort of 
Invasion of Privacy for Australia?” (2005) 29:2 Melbourne UL Rev 339 at 368. 
140 Krouse v. Chrysler Canada Ltd (1973), 13 CPR (2d) 28, 1 OR (2d) 225 (CA). 
141 Ibid at para 37. 
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Athans Jr v Canadian Adventure Camps Co,142 which involved the unauthorized use 
by the corporate defendant of the plaintiff’s image and persona as a water skier to 
promote the former’s summer camp. The trial judge held that by using the plaintiff’s 
image to advertise their camp, the defendant had infringed the former’s right to market 
his personality—and this was tortious, independent of any claim in copyright law.143 
Moreover, as with the statutory torts above, it appears that actionability depends on 
some mixture of economic benefit to the defendant, or at least some use by him of the 
plaintiff’s likeness for advertising purposes.144 It may well be that other provinces 
without discrete statutory torts may follow Ontario’s lead in this respect, although, to 
date, the issue has not been litigated in these jurisdictions.145  
 
The potential reach of these appropriation torts is inherently limited by the 
twin requirements that (i) only the plaintiff’s likeness (and, in British Columbia, voice) 
is protected, and (ii) that the defendant must use this likeness for the purposes of 
advertising or other commercial gain. Accordingly, these actions would not apply to 
invasions of informational privacy, such as email hacking and distribution; nor would 
they apply to the taking of unauthorized photographs, if these were not then used for 
commercial benefit.  
 
v. A Note on Private Sector Data Protection Legislation 
 
A detailed discussion of data protection legislation falls outside the present scope of 
this paper, as my primary purpose is to examine the various common law actions that 
have been used to protect individual privacy. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile making a 
few brief points, for completeness.  
 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act146 
(PIPEDA) is a federal statute applicable to private sector organizations in Canada that 
collect, use, or disclosure “personal information” in the course of their “commercial 
activities”. Personal information is defined as “information about an identifiable 
individual”.147 PIPEDA imposes 10 obligations (referred to as “fair information 
                                                          
142 Athans Jr v Canadian Adventure Camps Co, [1977] 2 ACWS 1065, 17 OR (2d) 425 (SC, H Ct J). 
143 Ibid at para 28. 
144 See Conroy, supra note 139 at 13, discussing two cases in Ontario that reflect this view: Horton v Tim 
Donut, [1997] OJ No 390, 68 ACWS (3d) 1030 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)), and Gould Estate v Stoddart 
Publishing Co, [1996] OJ No 3288, 65 ACWS (3d) 998 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)). 
145 See Conroy, supra note 139 at 10. 
146 SC 2000, c 5. 
147 Ibid, s 2(1). 
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principles”148) on organizations with regard to the handling of personal information.149 
Three of these principles are core: the first is the idea of individual consent; the second 
and third concern organizational transparency and accountability in the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal information.150 PIPEDA also imposes an overarching, 
additional limitation: for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information to 
be legitimate, it must be done “only for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider…appropriate in the circumstances”.151 The objective reasonableness 
requirement serves to buttress the consent paradigm. Broadly speaking, the PIPEDA 
regime can thus be characterized as conditioning fair information practices upon a 
combination of individual consent and objective reasonableness in the collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal information.152 
 
Three provinces (Alberta,153 British Columbia,154 and Quebec155) have 
enacted private sector data protection legislation that the federal cabinet has deemed 
“substantially similar” to PIPEDA.156 This designation means private sector 
organizations in these three provinces are exempt from the operation of PIPEDA.157 
PIPEDA remains applicable to private sector organizations in the rest of Canada, 
however. The Alberta and British Columbia Acts (referred to as PIPAs) are very 
similar.158 Like PIPEDA, their purpose is to govern the collection, use, and disclosure 
of personal information, which is defined similarly as in PIPEDA.159 Like PIPEDA, 
the PIPAs place substantive restrictions on the collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal information by adopting substantively similar “fair information principles”, 
and they also subject such dealing in personal information to an overarching 
reasonableness requirement.160  
 
                                                          
148 See Colin HH McNairn, A Guide to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2010) at 3. 
149 Supra note 146 Schedule I. These principles are: Accountability; Identifying Purpose; Consent; Limiting 
Collection; Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention; Accuracy; Safeguards; Openness; Individual Access; 
Challenging Compliance. 
150 See Lisa M Austin, “Is Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experience 
Under PIPEDA” (2005) 56:2 UTLJ 181.  
151  Supra note 146, s 5(3) [emphasis added]. 
152 Supra note 150 at 207-10. 
153 Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5. 
154 Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63. 
155 An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, RSQ c P-39.1. 
156 Supra note 148 at 9. 
157 Ibid. For individual provincial regulations, see: Quebec: SOR/2003-374; Alberta: SOR/2004-219; British 
Columbia: SOR/2004-220. See also supra note 146, s 26(2)(b). 
158 The Quebec legislation will not be discussed in this paper. 
159 Supra note 153, ss 1, 3; supra note 154, ss 1, 2. 
160 Supra note 153, ss 11, 14, 15; supra note 154, ss 4, 12, 13. 
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These legislative regimes have the obvious potential to play an important role 
in protecting personal privacy—indeed, doing so is their very raison d’être.161 That 
said, they also suffer from a few significant limitations. The first, and perhaps most 
important, limitation is contained in PIPEDA, and thus applies to every common law 
province in Canada other than Alberta and British Columbia, namely: PIPEDA does 
not apply unless the organization is dealing with personal information in the “course 
of commercial activities”.162 Moreover, all three legislative regimes contain a series of 
exemptions that permit collecting, storing, and disclosing information for various, 
broadly defined purposes, including personal or domestic use, and artistic, literary, or 
journalistic reasons.163 Adjudicators treat these categorical exemptions as 
jurisdictional in nature, so that if they apply in fact, there is no jurisdiction to impose 
any restrictions on an organization’s dealing with personal information.164 These limits 
mean that Canada’s private sector data protection regimes will not capture a wide 
variety of privacy-invading conduct committed by a wide variety of differently 
motivated individuals. 
 
4. Problems with this Hodgepodge Protection of Privacy 
 
These efforts by judges to press existing causes of action into service to protect privacy 
have resulted in a patchwork of protection that is not inconsiderable. Nevertheless, this 
hodgepodge approach suffers from three inherent shortcomings: (i) there are gaps in 
the protection of privacy that this farrago affords; and using a hodgepodge of torts to 
protect privacy indirectly, rather than directly via a discrete privacy tort, (ii) causes 
conceptual and jurisdictional fragmentation, and (iii) results inevitably in unprincipled 
decisions making. In this section, I briefly elaborate on these three points. 
 
(A) Gaps in Protection 
 
The above discussion illustrates that, owing to the internal limitations of each 
nominate cause of action discussed, various gaps exist resulting in privacy being 
under-protected in those common law provinces that lack discrete statutory privacy 
torts or equivalent common law actions.165 Consider, for example, if a case similar to 
Kaye were to arise in one of these jurisdictions, but with the facts slightly altered so 
that the defendant magazine did not publish the contrived “interview” of the semi-
conscious patient. In Kaye, Lord Justices Leggatt and Bingham both condemned the 
                                                          
161 See supra note 146, s 3. 
162 Ibid, s 4(1)(a). Note that this requirement is obviated where the information is about an employee working 
in a federal undertaking: s 4(1)(b). 
163  Ibid, ss 4(2)(b)-(c); supra note 153, ss 4(3)(a)-(c); supra note 154, ss 3(2)(a)-(b). 
164 For a discussion, see: Teresa Scassa, “Journalistic Purposes and Private Sector Data Protection 
Legislation: Blogs, Tweets, and Information Maps” (2010) 35 Queen’s LJ 733 at 755. 
165 Specifically, Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, the Yukon and the Northwest 
Territories. 
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bare intrusion into privacy in the strongest possible terms,166 yet, in many Canadian 
provinces, the victim would be left without a remedy. Breach of confidence would not 
apply absent actual or threatened disclosure of the private information.167 Defamation 
and malicious falsehood similarly require disclosures. The various data protection 
regimes would not capture the defendant if he was acting for a journalistic purpose, or 
if he was acting for a purely personal purpose of morbid voyeurism. Trespass to the 
person is not available, as there was no touching, and trespass to property would not 
apply unless the hospital, as legal occupier, consented to be joined as a plaintiff.168 
Private nuisance suffers from the same limitation, and public nuisance will not capture 
invasions of privacy targeted at a single person. Appropriation of personality requires 
some commercial gain to the defendant, which would not be the case if the claimant 
was not a celebrity (with a marketable image) or, in any event, if the defendant did not 
publish the “interview”. The Wilkinson tort may be the only avenue for redress, yet it 
would not apply if the claimant’s injury failed to reach the level of physical harm or 
constitute a recognized psychiatric illness, which will, of course, often not be the 
case—especially where the plaintiff, as in Kaye, was only semi-conscious at the time 
of the intrusion and perhaps incapable of appreciating its gravity. 
 
In short, a claimant in such circumstances as imagined above would find 
themselves without an adequate remedy in several Canadian jurisdictions, despite 
suffering what the English Court of Appeal described as a “monstrous” invasion of 
privacy.169  
 
(B) Conceptual and Jurisdictional Fragmentation 
 
The second problem with this hodgepodge approach is the fragmentation of analysis 
required to canvass the multiplicity of actions surveyed above. It is not conducive to 
clear analysis to require plaintiffs to press their privacy claims into this farrago. 
Professor Markesinis, speaking in the context of the English common law before the 
House of Lords’ decision in Campbell, lamented that this fragmented approach was 
“patchy, capricious”, and “uncertain”.170 It is indirect and conceptually confusing, and 
must inevitably impede the development of a coherent and principled law of privacy 
as a result.171 
 
                                                          
166 Supra note 72 at 71 (Leggatt LJ), 70 (Bingham LJ). 
167 See Mulheron, supra note 130 at 686-87; Christie, Moreham & Warby, supra note 43 at 431. 
168 As noted by Sims, supra note 130 at n 19. 
169 As acknowledged by Bingham LJ in supra note 72 at 70 (“The defendants’ conduct…here was ‘a 
monstrous invasion of…privacy’…If ever a person has a right to be let alone…it must surely be when he 
lies in hospital recovering from brain surgery and in no more than partial command of his faculties.”). 
170 Markesinis, supra note 95 at 805. 
171 Supra note 75 at 24 (Noting there is “little chance of a coherent body of rules being developed” out a 
fragmented, hodgepodge approach to protecting privacy). See similarly: Eric Descheemaeker, “‘Veritas non 
est Defamatio’? Truth as a Defence in the Law of Defamation” (2011) 31:1 LS 1 at 19. 
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In England, this conceptual fragmentation is exacerbated by jurisdictional 
fragmentation.  Recall that in Campbell the House of Lords modified the equitable 
breach of confidence action (by dropping the requirement of an antecedent relationship 
of confidence) in order to provide a remedy to a supermodel whose image was 
captured and published by a paparazzo whom she had never met. Although several 
subsequent cases have referred to the reworked action as the “tort [of] misuse of 
private information”,172 it is clear from the majority in Campbell that, despite its stark 
departure from orthodoxy, this action remains anchored in breach of confidence.173 
This was made plain by the English Court of Appeal in Douglas v Hello! (No. 3),174 
the first case to consider the reworked action after Campbell. The problem here is that, 
in England, post Campbell, equity formally protects against disclosures, whereas a 
combination of nominate common law torts protect against bare intrusions into privacy 
not followed by subsequent disclosures. So long as confidence is used to protect 
against disclosures, this fragmentation will persist since the reworked confidence 
action cannot in principle extend to bare intrusions.175 Accordingly, breach of 
confidence cannot form the basis of a comprehensive law of privacy.176 In my view, it 
cannot be right, as a matter of principle, to split these two types of privacy invasion—
disclosures and intrusions—between equity on the one hand and common law tort on 
the other. The underlying complaint in both cases is that the person’s right to privacy 
is violated. One action should cover both situations. 
 
 This jurisdictional fragmentation is avoided in those Canadian provinces with 
discrete statutory torts covering both intrusions and disclosures. As mentioned, in 
Ontario the common law privacy tort thus far only captures intrusions; it is hoped that 
courts will extend it to capture unauthorized disclosures of private information as 
well.177 The remaining provinces in Canada should eschew the English breach of 
confidence approach, and instead recognize (through legislation or through the courts) 
discrete common law privacy torts covering both intrusions and disclosures. 
 
                                                          
172 See e.g. McKennitt & Ors v Ash & Anor, [2005] EWHC 3003, at para 8, [2006] EMLR 10 (QB); supra 
note 128 at para 65. 
173 Supra note 2: Lord Hope, at paras 85-87; Baroness Hale, at para 134; Lord Carswell, at para 162-3; cf 
Nicole Moreham, “Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis” (2005) 121 Law 
Rev 628 (making this point).  
174 Douglas, supra note 126 at paras 9, 96. But see contra supra note 128 at para 65 (“[T]here is now a tort 
of misuse of private information”). 
175 This view has been expressed by a number of commentators: Basil Markesinis et al, “Concerns and Ideas 
About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help)” 
(2004) 52:1 Am J Comp L 133 at 182; Butler, supra note 139 at 352; supra note 45 at 457. But note that, as 
mentioned above, in supra note 128, the English Court of Appeal recently held that simply accessing 
another’s private documents, even without disclosure, may constitute a breach of confidence.   
176 Supra note 45 at 457; cf Hilary Delany, “Breach of Confidence or Breach of Privacy: The Way Forward” 
(2005) 27 Dublin U L J 151 at 166-68. 
177 For an elaboration of this point, examining the limits of the Ontario approach, see supra note 1. 
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(C) Unprincipled Decision Making 
 
The final problem with the hodgepodge approach is that it is unprincipled. None of the 
nominate torts surveyed above have the protection of privacy as their core value. Each 
responds to a variety of different policies, such as the protection of reputation 
(defamation), compensation for psychiatric harm (intentional infliction of emotional 
distress), or the affirmation of the right to exclude others from property (trespass). It 
is, of course, owing to these different underlying policies that these various actions 
have developed their respective requirements and limitations. These requirements, 
which are sensible when measured against the raison d’être of each action, become 
less so when they are pressed into service to protect privacy. A better approach, surely, 
is to develop an independent tort that has the protection of privacy as its core value. 
Such an approach—protecting privacy directly, rather than obliquely—would surely 
be conducive to clearer analysis, result in fuller protection, and generally facilitate a 
coherent, and principled, law of privacy to develop.178  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Until recently, Commonwealth courts had been notoriously reluctant to recognize the 
invasion of privacy as an independent actionable wrong. Nevertheless, from the above 
survey we see that many courts have been willing to fashion relief for invasions of 
privacy by pressing other nominate causes of action into service. While this 
hodgepodge approach does in totality yield a considerable measure of privacy 
protection, I have argued that it suffers from three related deficiencies. First, there are 
gaps in protection, especially concerning bare intrusions. Second, the analysis is 
fragmented both conceptually, by virtue of the hodgepodge itself, and jurisdictionally, 
at least in England, where equity protects against disclosures, whereas a variety of torts 
protect against bare intrusions. This fragmentation leads to the third shortcoming: 
pressing various torts into service to protect privacy necessarily thwarts principled 
decision-making, as none of these other actions have the protection of privacy, and its 
complex array of underlying values, as their core function.  
 
In my view, provincial legislatures should act to create statutory privacy torts 
covering both intrusions and disclosures in those Canadian jurisdictions that have not 
yet done so. If they do not, judges should follow Justice Sharpe’s lead in Jones and 
develop a discrete common law privacy tort.  
 
 
 
                                                          
178 Edward Bloustein, “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser” (1964) 39 
NYUL Rev 962 at 1004-05 (emphasising the need to identify a core value underpinning privacy tort cases 
in America so as to guide the development of the law in a conceptually unified and principled manner); cf 
Descheemaeker, supra note 171 at 19 (pressing various causes of action into service encourages fragmentary 
analysis, making it “virtually impossible to treat like cases alike”, and will have the “unavoidable effect of 
adding to…the injustice of not granting principled protection to this [privacy] interest”). 
